Alberto Donzelli: Urgent moratorium on the marketing of self-replicating RNA “vaccines” Podcast

The European Commission has authorized the commercialization of “Kostaive” (zapomeran), the first self-amplifying RNA (saRNA) vaccine for COVID-19. While proponents highlight advantages such as lower required doses and longer-lasting immune responses compared to traditional mRNA vaccines, significant safety concerns have been raised. A primary concern centers on the potential for saRNA molecules to replicate excessively within cells and be packaged into extracellular vesicles (EVs). These EVs can then spread throughout the body and potentially be transmitted between individuals and even across species through bodily fluids and lung exhalations. These unprecedented safety issues warrant an urgent moratorium on the commercialization of these vaccines until further in-depth studies are conducted.

Main Themes and Key Points:

1. Introduction of saRNA Technology and Kostaive (Zapomeran):

• saRNA technology is presented as the “latest frontier in the use of RNA in vaccinology” and a “breakthrough” in drug and vaccine development.
• Kostaive (zapomeran) is identified as the first self-amplifying mRNA vaccine for COVID-19 authorized by the European Commission (February 2025), following an EMA recommendation (December 2024). It is also in use in Japan.
• Like existing mRNA vaccines, saRNA vaccines are delivered using lipid nanoparticles (LNPs).
• The self-amplifying nature of saRNA allows for lower administered doses compared to mRNA vaccines while aiming for comparable or enhanced immune responses. The SIF Magazine article notes that clinical studies for Zapomeran demonstrated a “greater immune response compared to conventional mRNA vaccines, maintaining it for up to 12 months.”

1. Mechanism of saRNA Replication and Potential for Excessive Production:

• saRNA molecules, based on alphaviruses, contain instructions for both the target antigen (Spike protein for Kostaive) and enzymes that facilitate their self-replication within the cell.
• This replication can lead to a “greater production of the protein of interest (up to 80-100 times more) and for much longer times,” as proudly stated by a pharmacologist member of the Italian Society of Pharmacology, according to the Donzelli article.
• While intended to boost the immune response, this excessive intracellular accumulation of saRNA is identified as a “relevant drawback” by Federico.

1. Extracellular Vesicle (EV) Packaging and Spread:

• The primary and most significant safety concern highlighted is the potential for cells to package excessive saRNA molecules into extracellular vesicles (EVs) as a mechanism to eliminate waste or excess molecules.
• These EVs can shed from the plasma membrane (microvesicles) or originate internally from endosomes (exosomes).
• EVs containing saRNA can enter neighboring and distant cells and tissues, potentially initiating new replication cycles, leading to an “unwanted and unnecessary spread of saRNA throughout the body.”
• This mechanism is supported by studies on alphavirus genomes spreading through EVs.

1. Potential for Interhuman and Inter-species Transmission via EVs:

• The Federico article explicitly states that circulatory EVs can migrate to lung tissues and that “well-detectable amounts of EVs have been found associated with lung exhalations.”
• The Donzelli article builds upon this, stating that “besides body fluids (saliva, sweat, etc.), lung exhalations can transmit vesicles that incorporate saRNA, with theoretical possibility of interhuman transmission.”
• Furthermore, the Donzelli article warns that “such vesicles do not recognize species barriers, and could therefore also enter animal cells, triggering potential transmissions from humans to animals and vice versa.”

1. Exacerbation of Known Adverse Events and New Safety Issues:

• The spread of saRNA-loaded EVs carrying the Spike protein can “exacerbate the adverse events already widely described for mRNA vaccines.”
• The continuous and widespread expression of the Spike protein throughout the body due to this spread raises concerns about its overall toxicity due to binding with ACE2 and other targets, potentially leading to “inflammatory responses, immune dysregulation, and autoimmunity.”
• These issues pose “unprecedented safety problems, currently studied to an entirely inadequate extent.”

1. Lack of Adequate Safety Studies and Precautionary Principle:

• The Donzelli article strongly argues that “in the absence of much more in-depth studies, the precautionary principle would therefore require an immediate moratorium on the commercialization in Europe of these so-called ‘vaccines’.”
• Federico supports this, stating that “a safety improvement of saRNA-based vaccines appears to be mandatory for their usage in healthy humans” and that “relevant safety issues still need to be addressed, especially regarding the use of saRNA expressing biologically active products in healthy humans, also considering that current rules for nonclinical evaluation of vaccines do not require pharmacokinetic studies.”

1. Proposed Mitigation Strategy and Its Limitations:

• The Federico article proposes a theoretical method to control saRNA spread by co-expressing a modified protein (Nefmut/nsP2 fusion) that inhibits saRNA replication in bystander cells and potentially induces an immune response against saRNA-expressing cells.
• However, this is presented as a “theoretical way to control them” and requires further development for “second-generation saRNA-based vaccines.” It doesn’t address the immediate concerns with currently authorized saRNA vaccines.

1. Calls for a Moratorium and Political Action:

• The Donzelli article explicitly calls for an “immediate moratorium” on the commercialization of saRNA vaccines in Europe.
• It urges political figures, including Florida Governor Ron De Santis, Surgeon General Joseph Ladapo, and Robert Kennedy Jr., to support Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni in requesting a moratorium from the European Commission by June 9th.
• The author emphasizes that a decision with such potentially “universal consequences should not be taken without in-depth adversarial scientific debate and broad democratic discussion in the countries that would be involved.”

Contrasting Perspectives (Noted in Sources):

• The SIF Magazine article, while acknowledging possible mild flu-like symptoms (less than mRNA vaccines due to lower initial dose), focuses primarily on the perceived benefits of Zapomeran: “enhanced efficacy and long duration,” lower required doses, and potential for producing more doses per preparation. It does not mention the concerns about EV spread or transmission.
• The European Commission’s authorization and the EMA’s recommendation indicate a positive assessment from regulatory bodies at that time.

Most Important Ideas/Facts:

• Kostaive (zapomeran), the first saRNA COVID-19 vaccine, has been authorized in Europe despite potential safety concerns.
• saRNA’s self-amplifying nature can lead to significantly higher and more prolonged production of the target antigen (Spike protein) within cells.
• There is a scientifically plausible mechanism for saRNA to be packaged into extracellular vesicles (EVs).
• EVs containing saRNA could potentially spread throughout the vaccinated individual’s body and potentially be transmitted to others and across species through bodily fluids and lung exhalations.
• These potential consequences raise “unprecedented safety problems” that have not been adequately studied.
• Advocates for a moratorium argue that the precautionary principle warrants halting commercialization until comprehensive safety studies are conducted.

Implications:

The widespread use of saRNA vaccines like Kostaive without fully understanding and mitigating the potential for EV-mediated spread and transmission could have significant public health implications, potentially affecting both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals, as well as animal populations. The call for a moratorium reflects a serious concern from some scientific and medical professionals regarding the potential for uncontrolled biological consequences.

Further Action Recommended:

• Conduct urgent and comprehensive research into the potential for saRNA-based vaccines to be packaged into and transmitted via extracellular vesicles.
• Investigate the biodistribution and persistence of saRNA and expressed antigens (like the Spike protein) over extended periods.
• Evaluate the potential for interhuman and inter-species transmission of saRNA through various routes, including lung exhalations.
• Engage in broad and transparent scientific and public debate regarding the risks and benefits of saRNA technology before widespread deployment.
• Consider implementing a moratorium on the commercialization and use of saRNA vaccines until these critical safety questions are adequately addressed.